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Abstract
This paper considers the formation of cities in a simple model in which the pref-
erences of agents depend on at most two characteristics of a location: its population and
its average distance to the other agents. In such a simple model it is possible to recreate
phenomena such as path dependency and centrally located cities which have been gen-
erated in more sophisticated models. Moreover, an example is provided in which cities
emerge in the sense that the micro level preferences of agents do not appear to favor lo-
cating near or with other agents. When nonlinear eects are included then it is possible
to show that even if ecient equilibria exist, they are not likely to occur and that there
may exist extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. The model suggests that the mapping
from individual preferences to population distributions merits further study.
ON THE EMERGENCE OF CITIES
Scott E. Page

1 Introduction
This paper examines population aggregation in a model in which individual agents make
location decisions on a two dimensional lattice. The analysis greatly simplies earlier
models of city formation by isolating the mapping from individual level relocation deci-
sions to macro-level population patterns. Individuals, who may be thought of as either
rms or people, have simple preferences, and as a result their behavior can be charac-
terized by rules. The accumulation of these rules forms a complex adaptive system in
which either expected or emergent phenomena may occur. This paper does not claim to
provide denitive answers as to how and why cities form but instead, to demonstrate two
facts: rst, that skeletal models can often provide the same insights as more sophisticated
approaches and second, that macro phenomena need not bear a strong resemblance to
their micro foundations. The question of why cities form claries the latter point. Many
models which generate cities include explicit gains from aggregation at the micro level.
To presume micro level preferences which mimic macro level phenomena, though an ob-
vious modelling choice, may be an incorrect one. That cities form when all agents want
to reside near one another would not surprise anyone. That they can form when agents
do not appear to have incentives to agglomerate, for example when agents want to live as
far away from other agents as possible, does oer a hint into the complex map between
agent level preferences and equilibrium population distributions.
The main results of this paper are as follows: Cities are shown to form under a
variety of settings. In some scenarios their location can be sensitive to initial conditions
and/or path dependent : identical micro{level preferences can lead to a single city in the
center or four cities in the corners of the lattice. In other scenarios, the size and spatial
distribution of cities is inevitable. In either case, the equilibrium distribution of cities
need not be utility maximizing. Finally, restrictions on mobility can change the set of
equilibrium population distributions in nontrivial ways.

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In the formal model, agents relocate in response to the distribution of agents on
the lattice. As mentioned, these agents may be thought of as either individuals or rms.
Preference characteristics of the agents often make one of the these assumptions more
likely than the other. In the spirit of Schelling (1978), the model is not burdened with
many moving parts. Agent behavior is a function of only two characteristics of the popu-
lation distribution: separation and population. Separation refers to the average distance
to other agents, and population equals the number of agents at a particular location.
These characteristics may enter agents' utilities positively, negatively, or both positively
and negatively in the case of higher order eects. The mapping from preferences to
equilibrium distributions is then analyzed under two assumptions about mobility: global
and local relocation ability. Under global relocations, agents can move anywhere on the
lattice. Under local relocations, they are restricted to neighboring cells. The analysis
focuses on three aspects of the equilibrium population distributions: their spatial char-
acteristics, their sensitivity to initial conditions, and their aggregate utility.
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Owing to
the dynamic nature of the phenomena of city formation, a static theorem proof approach
permits only a limited view. Additional knowledge can be gained from watching cities
form in computational experiments under various assumptions about micro{level behav-
ior. Accordingly, the analysis to follow combines mathematical and computational theory
(Judd 1995).
Many earlier models of city formation include either an explicit, or a not so deeply
buried assumption of increasing returns from agglomeration Krugman 1996). Such as-
sumptions are motivated by references to complementarities between industries, savings
owing to transportation costs, or sharing of the xed costs of operating a market. The
assumption that the benets to agglomeration increase with city size guarantees the for-
mation of cities. To refer to the phenomena of city formation in such environments as
emergent may be misleading. The term emergent applies to epi-phenomena which are
unexpected (Forrest 1990), or at a minimum not obvious as is the case in many city for-
mation models, and as mentioned, there are environments in which cities emerge in this
stricter sense { without an explicit assumption of positive returns from agglomeration.
Some comments are in order as to this model's intended contribution to the grow-
ing literature on city formation. Recently, economists have reconsidered the role of cities
in the economy (Arthur 1991, Krugman 1993, Lucas 1988, Berliant and Konishi 1994).
This renewed interest in city formation stems partially from the engaging historical ac-
counts of Jacobs (1969, 1984) and Cronon (1991) as well as from increased recognition
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A equal weight utilitarian social welfare function measures the total utility of a population
distribution.
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of increasing returns (Arthur 1991). More generally, an awareness of human capital's
contribution to growth has directed economists towards the role of cities. In his review
of the literature on economic development, Lucas (1988) concludes that in order for cities
to exist there must be some external benets from agglomeration. If cities play a central
role in the growth of the economy, i.e. if as in Jacobs' theory they are the nucleus of the
atom, then the study of their formation, size, and location should be central to the study
of the macroeconomy.
Models of city development range from general equilibrium models which show the
existence of pareto ecient equilibria to examples assuming particular functional forms
(Krugman 1993). As an example of the former, Berliant and Konishi (1994) assume
that cities allow agents to exploit gains from trade and share transportation and market-
place setup costs. They show that provided certain technical assumptions are satised
that there exists a pareto ecient equilibrium. While important, this approach to mod-
elling does not address the relationship between micro{level preferences and equilibrium
distributions much less issues such as the amount of sensitivity to initial conditions.
In contrast, the approaches taken by Krugman (1996) and Arthur (1991) permit
the study of the sensitivity of city location to initial conditions. Silicon Valley and Route
128 are often trotted out as evidence that such sensitivity may actually exist. Neither
region possessed a natural advantage for high technology industries, yet both attracted
them in large numbers. In Arthur's model, rms possess complementary technologies de-
pending upon location { rms benet from locating near one another. These locational
complementaries can create extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. In contrast, Krug-
man's model considers an economy with both agricultural and manufacturing sectors.
His model combines a Dixit{Stiglitz monopolistic competition model with Samuelson's
spoilage or \iceberg" transportation costs model, in which a fraction of the goods are lost
during transport. Transportation costs and the benets from agglomeration lead to city
formation. However, in his model, the city forms at or near the midpoint of the linear
world. Thus, he nds a moderate level of sensitivity to initial conditions but nowhere
near the levels found in Arthur's model.
2
Krugman and Arthur oer stylized models of city formation. As a result, care
must be taken not to overinterpret either model. Krugman's modelling decisions, made
with an eye for tractability, are not benign. His emphasis on transportation costs drives
the limited sensitivity to initial conditions. Similarly, Arthur's assumption of positive
externalities between rms creates the extreme sensitivity to initial conditions which
2
Krugman (1996) has also constructed a model on a ring in which he does generate similar sensitivity
to initial conditions as found in Arthur.
3
he nds. As shall be demonstrated in the paper, this variation in sensitivity to initial
conditions depends in an understandable way upon the micro-level incentives of the
agents. If agents care primarily about their distance to other agents, in the language of
this paper their separation, then sensitivity to initial conditions is limited. If agents care
about population, then extreme sensitivity to initial conditions may exist.
Urban economists (Mills 1980) have long recognized both negative and positive
eects from agglomeration.
3
Negative eects of agglomeration, or congestion eects,
mitigate the value of moving to a single large city for citizens. In the case of rms, negative
complementarities, such as Pigou's famous example of laundries and industrial smoke may
induce rms to choose spatially disparate locations. In the case of individuals, crowding
can bring crime, trac, and pollution. The inclusion of negative complementarities often
results in environments in which the equilibria distributions of agents are not Pareto
ecient.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic
model which is dened on an N by N lattice. Section 3 presents the mathematical and
computational theory for the eight cases with linear preferences, and section 4 considers
nonlinear preferences. The reliance on computation stems from the number of cases
considered and the fact that the intent here is to exhibit the subtleties of the micro to
macro transition. The discussion at the end of the paper addresses possible extensions
of the model, many of which have been explored computationally.
2 A Model of City Formation
A skeletal model is designed to capture spatial population accumulation brought about
by agents' relocation decisions. In the model, there are assumed to be a nite number
of agents who reside on an N by N lattice. These agents may be thought of as either
individuals or rms. In several of the scenarios considered, rms may be a more appro-
priate interpretation. The assumption of a square lattice is not benign. Several ndings
depend upon it. This shortcoming appears unavoidable and suggests the need for future
work with irregular lattices and lattices which approximate actual geography.
3
Krugman's and Arthur both mention the potential for negative eects from agglomeration. but
neither makes them a central feature of his model. To criticize Arthur, Krugman, and others for down-
playing negative agglomeration eects would be unfair. Krugman refers to his work as a \pilot{study"
and admits that the particular functional forms were chosen because they were `tractable." These early
models have been attempts to focus attention on heretofore neglected issues: in Krugman's case the im-
portance of regional economics and in Arthur's the prevalence of increasing returns in economics. Both
models have been successful in this respect. This paper builds from their contributions in an obvious
direction.
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Def'n: The set of agents M = f1; 2; 3; :::mg
The set of all possible locations is an N by N lattice.
Def'n: The set of locations N N , where N = f1; 2; 3; :::ng
An agent's utility level, and, perforce, her relocation decision depend upon char-
acteristics of the distribution of agents on the lattice. For example, agents may prefer
to reside at highly populated locations, or they may prefer to minimize their distance
from other agents. Let F denote a distribution of agents on the set of locations. F can
be formalized as a map from the set of locations into M so that F
ij
denotes the number
of agents residing in the ith row and jth column of the lattice. A constraint must be
included so that total number of agents equals m.
Def'n: The set of distributions of agents
	 = fF : F : N N !M [ f0g; s.t.
n
X
i=1
n
X
j=1
F
ij
= mg
Agents have identical preferences over the distributions of agents. An agent's
utility depends upon her own location, and on the entire distribution.
Def'n: The utility function u : N N  F ! <
Since all agents are identical, a distribution F is utility maximizing if it maximizes
a utilitarian social welfare function.
Def'n: The distribution F 2 	 utility maximizing if and only if
n
X
i=1
n
X
j=1
F
ij
u(i; j; F ) 
n
X
i=1
n
X
j=1
F
0
ij
u(i; j; F
0
) for all F
0
2 	
An agent's utility may depend upon the population at her home location. The
population may enter positively; agents want to live near other agents. As discussed
in the introduction, there are several motivations for such an assumption, technological
5
externalities, the formation of marketplaces, and the creation of infrastructure to name
just a few. Alternatively, the population may enter negatively; agents might prefer to
have fewer agents living at their home location. This assumption is applicable when
agents are involved in agricultural production, where crowding occurs, or if agents prefer
to live in isolation than in a crowded city.
An agent's utility may also depend upon her average distance from other agents. If
agents face signicant transportation costs and if they trade with a signicant percentage
of the other agents, then they may wish to minimize their average distance to other
agents. Average distance could also enter into utility positively; agents may wish to
be as far from other agents as possible. If the agents represent rms and rms create
negative externalities and, moreover, if these externalities depend upon separation, then
this assumption is not unreasonable. Pigou's example of smokestacks and laundries would
be an example of this sort of preferences.
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When computing average distance, either of two measures can be used: A city
block distance measure, denoted by d
c
(i; j; F ), which counts the number of lattice points
horizontally and vertically which separate two locations or the standard Euclidean dis-
tance measure, denoted by d
e
(i; j; F ). The dynamics and end states depend in predictable
and unimportant ways on the choice of distance measure. The analysis which follows in-
cludes only the city block distance measure as it lends itself more readily to formal
analysis.
Def'n: The city block distance from (i

; j

) given F ,
d
c
(i

; j

; F ) =
1
m
n
X
i=1
n
X
j=1
F
ij
 (j i

  i j + j j

  j j)
2.1 Equilibria
Assumptions about the ability of agents to relocate are necessary before the equilibrium
distributions or the dynamics can be characterized. Two rules: global relocations and
local relocations are used in this analysis. Under global relocations, each agent chooses
the location on the lattice generating the highest utility. Agents take into account the
eect of their own movement on population.
5
In the event of a tie, an agent chooses the
rst location evaluated from among those generating the highest utility.
4
This would not be an appropriate model of isolationists, who would wish to minimize the number
of people living within a specied distance.
5
This is in contrast to many Tiebout models which assume that agents do not consider the eect of
their own relocations.
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Def'n: The distribution F is an equilibrium with respect to global relocations
if and only if F
ij
> 0 implies u(i; j; F )  u(i
0
; j
0
; F   
ij
+ 
i
0
j
0
) for all i
0
; j
0
, where

ij
: N N ! f0; 1g where 
ij
(i; j) = 1 and 
ij
(
^
i;
^
j) = 0 for (
^
i;
^
j) 6= (i; j).
Under local relocations, agents do not search the entire lattice for the best location.
They are restricted in how far they can move in any one iteration. They are also myopic.
They move to the best possible location within a xed neighborhood as opposed to
moving in the direction of the best location on the entire lattice. Agents are assumed to
be capable of computing their utility from each location in their local neighborhood.
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Def'n: The distribution F is an equilibrium with respect to local relocations of
distance d if and only if F
ij
> 0 implies u(i; j; F )  u(i
0
; j
0
; F   
ij
+ 
i
0
j
0
) for all i
0
; j
0
such that (j i  i
0
j + j j   j
0
j)  d where 
ij
(i; j) = 1 and 
ij
(
^
i;
^
j) = 0 for (
^
i;
^
j) 6= (i; j).
In the examples described below the size of a neighborhood equals one (d = 1).
Given the city block distance measure, agents may only move to one of the four horizontal
and vertical locations on the lattice. An agent residing at a corner location has only two
alternative locations in which to reside.
Two methodological issues remain: how agents time their relocation decisions and
how the initial population distributions are determined. The timing of updating, whether
synchronous or asynchronous, often qualitatively eects both dynamics and end states
(Huberman and Glance 1992). Given that relocation decisions might be made at any
time, in this model agents do not move simultaneously but instead relocate at dierent
times. The order of the asynchronous updating is random.
7
Agents are identied by
numbers ranging from 1 to m and placed in a que. In each period, the agents sequentially
choose to reside in the location oering the highest utility given the relocations of all
agents ahead of them in the que. The initial distribution of agents is random according
to a uniform distribution: agents have equal probability of being assigned to each location.
An assumption that agents were involved in agriculture prior to the formation of cities
makes this not an unreasonable assumption.
6
This assumption is a bit troublesome but is made for convenience. For some of the preferences
considered, agents need information about populations at all locations on the lattice in order to compute
the utility they obtain from the locations in their neighborhood.
7
An alternative approach is to use incentive based asynchronous updating. Under incentive based
asynchronous updating, the order in which agents relocate is determined by their utility from updating.
Those agents with the most to gain from relocating are the rst to relocate. Page (1995) shows that
incentive based asynchronous updating alters both dynamics and the distribution over end states for
several classes of cellular automata.
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3 Linear Preferences
The rst class of models to be analyzed assumes linear preferences. Recall that an agent's
utility at a location may depend upon either average distance from other agents, separa-
tion, or the location's population. In the models considered initially, these components
enter into the utility functions linearly. Preferences that depend on location population
alone are rst considered, then preferences that depend only on separation, and, nally,
linear combinations of location population and separation.
3.1 Population Preferences
Agents' utilities may either increase or decrease with the population at their home lo-
cation. Each possibility is considered in turn with both global and local relocations.
Population does not create a smooth utility gradient, so local relocations can result in
suboptimal equilibrium distributions.
3.1.1 Agglomeration
In the rst scenario, an agent's utility equals the population at her home location: an
agent residing at location (i; j) obtains a utility equal to F
ij
. The larger the local popu-
lation, the more utility accruing to the agent. In the global relocations scenario, the rst
agent to relocate chooses from among those locations with the largest population. The
next agent to relocate necessarily chooses the same location as the rst agent, as that
location now contains strictly more agents than any other. In turn all remaining agents
choose the same location, so that after one round of relocations, all agents reside in a
single large city. These dynamics are not particularly interesting other than that they
exhibit sensitivity to initial conditions: whichever location begins with the most agents
becomes the large city. The graph below shows the percentage of the population living
at each site on a nine by nine lattice. This and other examples are drawn from sample
computational experiments using one thousand agents. The nine by nine lattice makes
the presentation clearer than if much larger lattices, say one hundred by one hundred,
are used.
Global Relocations
u(i; j; F ) = F
ij
8
100
The next two claims state that a distribution F is an equilibrium with respect
to global relocations if and only if all agents reside at a single location and that these
equilibrium allocations are utility maximizing.
Claim 3.1 If u(i; j; F ) = F
ij
then F is an equilibrium with respect to sequential global
relocations if and only if there exists an (i; j) such that F
ij
= m
pf: If F
ij
= m then the utility from remaining at (i; j) equals m and the utility from any
other location equals 1. Thus, F is an equilibrium.
To prove the other direction, let K = max
(i;j)
f F
ij
g where K < m and show
that this leads to a contradiction. There are two cases to consider. First, suppose there
is a unique (i

; j

) such that F
ij
= K. For all (i; j) 6= (i

; j

), u(i; j; F ) < u(i

; j

; F ),
which implies that all agents must be located at (i

; j

), a contradiction. Second, suppose
F
ij
= F
i

j

= K and that (i; j) 6= (i

; j

). Consider an agent located at (i; j). Her utility
equals K. Her utility from (i

; j

) equals K + 1, a contradiction.
Claim 3.2 If u(i; j; F ) = F
ij
then F is utility maximizing if and only if there exists an
(i; j) such that F
ij
= m
pf: Maximizing the utilitarian social welfare function is equivalent to the following con-
strained maximization problem.
max
n
X
i=1
n
X
j=1
F
ij
 F
ij
subject to
n
X
i=1
n
X
j=1
F
ij
= m and F
ij
 0 for all (i; j)
The convexity of the objective function implies that optimum must occur at a corner.
All corners obtain an identical value of m
2
, which completes the proof.
In the local relocations scenario, the dynamics becomes more complicated. Each
agent in turn chooses a location in her neighborhood with maximal population. There
are two reasons why, unlike in the global relocation scenario, all agents do not choose
9
to reside at the same location in the rst round of relocations. First, the neighborhoods
of two agents need not intersect, in which case it is impossible for the second agent
to choose to reside at the same location as the rst agent. Second, among those agents
whose neighborhoods do intersect, the locations within their neighborhoods with maximal
population may dier. After a few rounds of relocations, the population pattern consists
of a congeries of small villages. For a distribution to be an equilibrium given these
dynamics, any two locations with strictly positive populations may not be adjacent, such
as in the diagram below. By claim 3.2 we know that the distribution is not utility
maximizing.
Local Relocations (d = 1)
u(i; j; F ) = F
ij
8
7
12 7
7
6 11
8
9 12
7
6
Under local relocations, the equilibrium population distributions are more sensi-
tive to initial conditions then they are under global relocations. Under global relocations,
the equilibrium distribution changes only if the initial location with the largest popu-
lation changes. Under local relocations, the distribution of the villages can be changed
more easily.
3.1.2 Isolation
Making the opposite assumption and assuming that agents want to live in lightly popu-
lated areas results in a very dierent equilibrium distribution. If u(i; j; F ) =  F
ij
, then
under global relocations, the agents spread themselves uniformly over the lattice as is
stated in Claim 3.3.
Claim 3.3 Assume m =   n
2
, where  is an integer. If u(i; j; F ) =  F
ij
, then F is
an equilibrium with respect to global relocations if and only if F
ij
=  for all (i; j)
10
pf: First, F
ij
=  for all (i; j) is shown to be an equilibrium. All agents obtain a utility
equal to  . The utility to an agent currently located at (i; j) from an alternative
location equals  ( + 1), thus F is an equilibrium.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium is shown by contradiction. Suppose that there exists an
(i; j) such that F
ij
 (+1). It follows that there exists an (i
0
; j
0
) such that F
i
0
j
0
 ( 1).
Any agent located at (i; j) would obtain strictly greater utility by moving to (i
0
; j
0
).
As the next claim states, this distribution is utility maximizing.
Claim 3.4 Assume m =  n
2
, where  is an integer. If u(i; j; F ) = F
ij
then F is utility
maximizing if and only if F
ij
=  for all (i; j):
pf: As before, set up the Lagrangian
max
F;
n
X
i=1
n
X
j=1
 F
ij
 F
ij
+   (
n
X
i=1
n
X
j=1
F
ij
 m)
The rst order necessary conditions:
2  F
ij
=  for all (i; j)
n
X
i=1
n
X
j=1
F
ij
= m
are sucient because the function is strictly concave. Therefore, the interior critical
point describes a unique maximum in which all locations have identical populations.
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Under local relocations, the equilibrium distributions which result from compu-
tational experiments are often nearly uniform. If the initial distribution is not approxi-
mately uniform, then the nal distribution may dier substantially as shown in the next
gure.
Local Relocations (d = 1)
u(i; j; F ) =  F
ij
1
1 1 2 1 1
1 1 2 3 2 1 1
1 1 2 3 4 3 2 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 4 3 2 1
1 1 2 3 4 3 2 1 1
1 1 2 3 2 1 1
1 1 2 1 1
1
3.2 Separation Preferences
Separation preferences assume that agents care about their average distance to other
agents. They may wish to be as close to other agents as possible on average, which might
be the case if agents trade extensively, or alternatively, agents may wish to distance
themselves from other agents. This latter assumption is defensible if agents do not want
other agents to trade or visit and if the probability that an agent visits another agent is
linear in distance.
An implication of separation preferences is that they create smooth utility gradi-
ents. In other words, if preferences are monotonic in separation, then the equilibria for
global and local relocations are identical. This is formally stated in the next claim.
Claim 3.5 If u(i; j; F ) = h(d
c
(i; j; F )) where h is strictly monotonic real valued function
then F is an equilibrium with respect to global relocations if and only if it is an equilibrium
with respect to local relocations.
pf: The only if direction holds by denition. Therefore, it suces to show that if a
distribution F is an equilibrium with respect to local relocations, then it is also an
equilibrium with respect to global relocations when u(i; j; F ) = h(d
c
(i; j; F )) and h is
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monotonic. Without loss of generality, assume that h is monotonically increasing. It
suces to show that the result holds for the case where h is the identity function.
The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that an agent residing at (i; j)
would benet by moving to (i
0
; j
0
), where i
0
> i and j
0
 j
0
. The utility increase in
moving from (i; j) to (i
0
; j
0
) is the sum of the increase of moving from (i; j) to (i
0
; j) and
the increase in moving from (i; j) to (i; j
0
). Therefore, let 
i
equal the change in utility
if the agent moves from (i; j) to (i
0
; j). It is sucient to prove that if this is strictly
positive then 
1
, the change in utility if the agent moves from (i; j) to (i + 1; j) is also
strictly positive. Let s(i) =
P
n
j=1
F
ij
. It is straightforward to show that

1
= 1 
n
X
k=i+1
s(k) +
i
X
k=1
s(k)
If i
0
  i = 1 then 
i
= 
1
, which completes the proof. Assume i
0
  i  2, it follows that

i
= (i
0
  i) +
n
X
k=i
0
(i
0
  i)  s(k) +
i
X
k=1
(i
0
  i)  s(k) +
i
0
 1
X
k=i+1
((i
0
  i)  2(k   i))  s(k)
Multiplying 
1
by (i
0
  i) and subtracting 
i
yields
(i
0
  1) 
1
  
i
=
i
0
 1
X
k=i+1
2(k   i)s(k)
Since all of the s(k)'s are greater than or equal to zero, it follows that 
1
> 0 which
completes the proof.
Note that even though the set of equilibria are the same, the dynamics may dier
substantially and as a result, identical starting points may lead to distinct equilibria, and
they typically do under global and local relocations.
3.2.1 Attraction
The more reasonable assumption is that agents prefer to be close to other agents so that
they might trade. Therefore, u(i; j; F ) =  d
c
(i; j; F ). In the global relocation scenario,
the rst agent to relocate chooses the location which has minimal average distance to all
other agents. Given the assumption of a uniform initial distribution of agent locations,
this agent locates near the center of the lattice. The location chosen by the next agent
and all subsequent agents will be either be the same, or dier by a small distance.
8
8
If for example, all agents are located in the center with one agent residing far to the north, then the
rst agent to relocate, provided she is not the northerner, may move out of the city. If the northerner
locates next, then she will chose to live in the city.
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After only a few rounds of adaptation, typically two or three, all agents reside in a single
location. Both the dynamics and the end state dier from the earlier case in which agents
cared only about population at their home location. The dynamics are more interesting
because convergence is not immediate. More importantly, the location of the end state
is not especially sensitive to initial conditions: the resulting single city is located at or
near the center of the lattice, just as in Krugman's more sophisticated model.
Under local relocations, in each time period agents march towards the center of
the lattice. Eventually, all agents reside at a single location at or near the center of the
lattice. The next two claims state that a single city is an equilibrium distribution for
both local and global relocations and that it is utility maximizing.
Claim 3.6 If u(i; j; F ) =  d
c
(i; j; F ) then F is an equilibrium with respect to global and
local relocations if and only if there exists an (i; j) such that F
ij
= m
pf: First suppose that there exists an (i; j) such that F
ij
= m. It follows that u(i; j; F ) =
0. If any agent relocates, her utility would be strictly negative. Therefore, F is an
equilibrium. The other direction is proven by contradiction. Suppose that F
ij
< m for
all (i; j). It suces to show that an agent can benet by relocating. Choose (i; j) and
(i
0
; j
0
) such that F
ij
> 0, F
i
0
j
0
> 0, and i < i
0
. Let s(i) =
P
n
j=1
F
ij
. If an agent moves
from (i; j) to (i+ 1; j), her change in utility 
i
given by

i
= 1 
i
X
k=1
s(k) +
n
X
k=i+1
s(k)
The one is because the agent does not move one unit away from herself when she relocates.
If an agent moves from (i
0
; j
0
) to (i
0
  1; j
0
), her change in utility 
i
0
given by

i
0
= 1 
n
X
k=i
0
s(k) +
i
0
 1
X
k=1
s(k)
There are two cases to consider. i
0
= i + 1 and i
0
> i+ 1. If i
0
= i+ 1 then

i
+
i
0
= 2
If i
0
> i + 1, then

i
+
i
0
= 2 + 2 
i
0
 1
X
k=i+1
s(k)
In either case, 
i
+
i
0
> 0 implying that one of the terms exceeds zero and completing
the proof.
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Claim 3.7 If u(i; j; F ) =  d
c
(i; j; F ) then F is utility maximizing if and only if there
exists an (i; j) such that F
ij
= m
pf: u(i; j; F )  0 for all F . Therefore, it suces to show that there exists an (i; j) such
that F
ij
= m if and only if
U(f) =
n
X
i=1
n
X
j=1
u(i; j; F )F
ij
= 0
Suppose F
ij
= m, then F
i
0
j
0
= 0 for all (i
0
; j
0
) 6= (i; j). A straightforward calculation
shows that U(F ) = 0. To prove the other direction, suppose that F
ij
< m for all (i; j).
Choose (i; j) and (i
0
; j
0
) so that F
ij
> 0 and F
i
0
j
0
> 0. It follows that d
c
(i; j) > 0 and
d
c
(i
0
; j
0
) > 0. which implies that the U(F ) > 0.
Interestingly, the set of equilibrium and utility maximizing distributions are not
biased towards the center. The city can lie anywhere on the lattice. In computational
experiments, the city always lies near the center because during the formation process
agents want to be close to other agents as well. Note the dierence between this and
Krugman's model in which farmers' remain in the surrounding areas and the city is near
the center to stay close to the markets. In the model presented here, the equilibrium
distribution contains no population outside of the city, yet the city is still centrally
located. The city's location is an artifact of the initial population distribution and does
not fulll any purpose in equilibrium.
3.2.2 Repulsion
If the alternative assumption is made so that agents wish to maximize their average
distance to other agents, then the dynamics and the distribution of end states changes
dramatically. In the global relocation scenario, the rst agent to relocate chooses a corner,
as do all other agents in turn.
Global and Local Relocations
u(i; j; F ) = d
c
(i; j; F )
18 32
15
32 18
If the populations in opposite corners are not equal, then agents continue to
relocate. The sensitivity to initial conditions is not extreme. The populations in the
corners may change, but not by much. In the local relocation scenario, agents crawl
towards the corners of the space, and within a few rounds of relocation, all agents reside
along the edges of the lattice. Eventually, the agents locate an equilibrium in which the
populations at opposite corners are equal. Again in this case, local and global relocation
lead to similar end states, although the dynamics dier. This is a case in which a macro
phenomenon emerges in the true sense. The aggregation of population in the corners
runs counter to the microlevel incentives which are to separate.
This intuition can be formalized without too much diculty. Claim 3.8 below
states that all stable allocations consist of all agents in the four corners with equal
populations in opposite corners.
Claim 3.8 Assume m is even. If u(i; j; F ) = d
c
(i; j; F ), then F is an equilibrium with re-
spect to global relocations if and only if F satises the following equalities:
F
11
= F
nn
F
1n
= F
n1
F
ij
= 0 if fi; jg 6 f1; n
pf: The proof proceeds in two parts. First, if fi; jg 6 f1; ng then it is shown that F
ij
= 0.
Then, the equality of the populations in opposite corners is shown.
Part 1: Suppose that an agent resides at (i; j) and fi; jg 6 f1; ng. Without loss of
generality assume that i 6 inf1; ng. Let s(i) =
P
n
j=1
F
ij
. Let 
+
equal the change in
utility if the agent moves to (i + 1; j) and 
 
equal the change in utility if the agent
moves to (i  1; j). It is straightforward to show that

+
= 1 
n
X
k=i+1
s(k) +
i
X
k=1
s(k)
and that

 
= 1 +
n
X
k=i
s(k) 
i 1
X
k=1
s(k)
adding the two terms obtains

+
+
 
= 2 + 2  s(i)
Since the sum of the two terms is strictly positive, one of the two terms must be positive,
which completes the rst part of the proof.
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Part 2: A straightforward calculation shows that if F
11
= F
nn
and F
1n
= F
n1
then no
agent increases her utility by relocating. By symmetry it suces to show that if F
ij
= 0
for all fi; jg 6 f1; ng and if F
11
< F
nn
then an agent would relocate from (n; n) to (1; 1).
Given these conditions, it follows that
u(1; 1; F )  u(n; n; F ) = 2(n  1)  [F
nn
  F
11
] > 0
which completes the proof.
Claim 3.9 states that this distribution is utility maximizing.
Claim 3.9 Assume m is even. If u(i; j; F ) = d
c
(i; j; F ), then F is utility maximizing if
and only if F satises the following equalities:
F
11
= F
nn
F
1n
= F
n1
F
ij
= 0 if fi; jg 6 f1; ng
pf: The Lagrangian for this problem is as follows:
max
F;
2
n 1
X
i=1
X
i
0
>i
n
X
j=1
n
X
j
0
=1
(i
0
 i)F
ij
F
i
0
j
0
+2
n 1
X
j=1
X
j
0
>j
n
X
i=1
n
X
i
0
=1
(j
0
 j)F
ij
F
i
0
j
0
+(
n
X
i=1
n
X
j=1
F
ij
 m)
Let s(i) =
P
n
j=1
F
ij
and r(j) =
P
n
i=1
F
ij
. The rst order necessary conditions can be
written as follows:
n
X
i=1
n
X
j=1
F
ij
= m
n
X
i
0
=1
j i
0
  i j s(i
0
) +
X
j
0
=1
n
j j
0
  j j r(j
0
) =  for all (i; j)
The crux of the proof is that s(i) = 0 for i 62 f1; ng and that r(j) = 0 for j 62 f0; 1g.
Holding j xed and subtracting the rst order necessary condition for (n  1; j) from the
rst order necessary condition for (n; j) obtains:
 s(1) +
n
X
i=1
s(i) = 0
Similarly, subtracting the rst order necessary condition for (2; j) from the rst order
necessary condition for (1; j) obtains:
 s(n) +
n 1
X
i=1
s(i) = 0
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Summing these two equalities yields
n 1
X
i=2
s(i) = 0
which implies that s(i) = 0 for i 2 f2; ::; n  1g. Substituting into the previous equation,
gives that s(1) = s(n). A similar argument shows that r(i) = 0 for i 2 f2; :; n  1g and
that r(1) = r(n). A straightforward calculation shows that if s(1) = s(n) =
m
2
= r(1) =
r(n) then all of the rst order conditions are satised. It also follows from the denitions
of s and r that F
ij
= 0 if fi; jg 6 f1; ng. Therefore, s(1) = s(n) can be rewritten as
F
11
+F
1n
= F
n1
+F
nn
and r(1) = r(n) as F
11
+F
n1
= F
1n
+Fnn. Adding the rst equation
to the second yields F
11
= F
nn
. Plugging this into either equation yields F
1n
= F
n1
. A
straightforward calculation shows that all distributions which satisfy F
11
= F
nn
and
F
1n
= F
n1
have identical values under the utilitarian social welfare function.
It remains to show that the rst order necessary conditions are sucient. As a rst
step in showing suciency, it is proven that any distribution F with F (i; j) > 0 for
some i 62 f1; ng, has a lower value under the utilitarian social welfare function than a
distribution, in which which an agent at location (i; j) is moved to either (i   1; j) or
(i+ 1; j). Let 
+
equal the change in the sum of the agents' utilities if the agent moves
to (i+1; j) and 
 
equal the change in the sum of the agents' utilities if the agent moves
to (i  1; j). It is straightforward to show that

+
= 2  [1 
n
X
k=i+1
s(k) +
i
X
k=1
s(k)]
and that

 
= 2  [1 +
n
X
k=i
s(k) 
i 1
X
k=1
s(k)]
adding the two terms gives

+
+
 
= 4 + 4  s(i) > 0
By symmetry, at the global optimum all agents must be located in the four corners.
To complete the proof, the population in opposite corners must be shown to be
equal. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that F
11
< F
nn
. There are two cases to
consider.
Case 1: F
nn
 F
11
+ 2: If an agent at location (1; 1) moves to location (n; n) then the
change in aggregate utility,  is given by:
 = 4n[F
nn
  1  F
11
] > 0
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Case 2: F
nn
  F
11
= 1: By assumption m, the total number of agents is even; therefore,
F
1n
6= F
n1
. Without loss of generality assume that F
1n
> F
n1
. If an agent at location
(n; n) moves to location (n; 1), then the change in aggregate utility, , is given by:
 = 2n[F
nn
  1  F
11
+ F
1n
  F
n1
] > 0
which completes the proof.
3.2.3 Summary
The table below summarizes the four cases with pure separation and agglomeration. The
entries in italics are those environments for which equilibrium distributions are sensitive
to the initial distribution.
Summary of Single Component Models
u(i; j; F ) Global Relocations Local Relocations Utility Max
F
i
j one city anywhere isolated villages one city anywhere
 F
i
j uniformly spread uniformly spread
9
uniformly spread
d
i
j four corners four corners four corners
 d
i
j one city near center one city near center one city anywhere
3.3 Separation and Agglomeration
The previous scenarios consider either population or separation but not both simultane-
ously, which is the next step in the analysis. For the moment, only linear combinations
of separation and agglomeration eects are considered. In the ensuing section, nonlin-
ear terms are included. For expediency, a genetic algorithm is used to approximate the
optimal population patterns (Holland 1975, Goldberg 1989) is applied to the environ-
ment. The genetic algorithm uses tournament selection and uniform crossover to search
for utility maximizing population distributions. Moreover, formal claims that population
distributions are equilibria are replaced by simulation ndings.
The coecients of population and distance may be either positive or negative, so
there are four cases to consider. In each case, the relative weights on the two components
can be varied.
3.3.1 Isolated Attraction
If both coecients are negative, then agents prefer lightly populated areas which are close
to the other agents spatially. The variable  > 0 measures the relative importance of the
distance component. With either global or local relocations, the equilibria resemble piles
of sand near the center of the lattice. The weight of the simulation evidence suggests that
the pile of sand is invariant to the initial distribution up to translations and rotations.
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Agents are balancing o their desire to be nearer other agents with their preference for a
less crowded home location. Thus, agents at the very center are nearer to other agents,
but must endure having a larger home location.
Global and Local Relocations
u(i; j; F ) =  F
ij
  d
c
(i; j; F )
3 3
4 8 8 4
1 7 11 11 7 1
4 8 8 4
3 3
Changes in the relative weight of the two components changes the equilibrium distribu-
tions in understandable directions. As  is increased (decreased) the piles of sand grows
taller (shorter) and encompasses a smaller (larger) area. Larger  imply that the agents
want to be closer together, which increases the population at the center. The sandpile
formation appears to vary smoothly with changes in .
The sandpile formation also appears to be optimal. A genetic algorithm searching
the space of distributions discovered the sandpile formation and, in many applications,
was unable to nd another distribution generating higher utility.
3.3.2 Agglomerated Attraction
Switching the sign on the coecient of F
ij
creates agents who prefer to live in highly
populated cities and close to other agents. With global relocation, the equilibrium distri-
bution is obvious. Agents locate in a single city near the center of the lattice. Given the
separation component the location of the city is less sensitive to initial conditions than
in the case where utility depended only on population. The proof that this distribution
utility maximizing follows from Claim 3.2 and Claim 3.7. With local relocations, agents
could become stuck in moderately sized cities which are spatially separated. The ndings
vary depending upon the relative weights on population and separation. If the popula-
tion term predominates, then the equilibrium distributions may be similar to those shown
below, while if the coecient of the separation term predominates, then the agents move
to a single city in the center.
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Local Relocations
u(i; j; F ) = +F
ij
  d
c
(i; j; F )
16
41
27
16
Notice also in the local relocation scenario, that the city sizes can vary. In the
single component models, the cities took on at most two distinct values, here they may
take on may more.
3.3.3 Agglomerated Repulsion
If the coecients of both the population and the separation term are positive, then the
end states vary signicantly under local and global relocation. Under global relocation,
the agents move to two opposing corners in the rst iteration. Typically, one of these
corners has a larger population than the other. In the second generation, all agents move
to the corner with the larger population. The outcome is a single city located in a corner.
This occurs because the population term begins to predominate. The single city in the
corner is also utility maximizing for small . Under local relocation, the agents move
towards the corners. Unless the population coecient is especially large, within a few
generations, the population is spread unevenly over the four corner locations. When the
population term predominates, then in addition to the four corner location, there may
also be locations just o center with positive population as shown below.
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Local Relocations
u(i; j; F ) = F
ij
+ d
c
(i; j; F )
19 23
7
6
21 24
3.3.4 Isolated Repulsion
The last linear case to consider is where the coecient on the population is negative and
the coecient on separation is positive. Less formally, agents wish to live at a location
with small population and want to be as far as possible from the other agents. Under
global relocation, the agents reside along the edges of the lattice, with a concentration
of agents near the corners. The end state appears to occur regardless of the initial
distribution. Under local relocation, the agents move towards the edges and often locates
the same equilibrium distribution as under global relocation. Sometimes the end state
diers slightly as asymmetries cannot be overcome by local movements. Computations
using a genetic algorithm suggest that these congurations are also utility maximizing.
Local Global Relocations
u(i; j; F ) =  F
ij
+ d
c
(i; j; F )
6.2 3.7 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.8 2.5 3.7 6.2
3.7 1.2 1.2 3.7
2.5 2.5
1.8 1.8
1.6 1.6
1.8 1.8
2.5 2.5
3.7 1.2 1.2 3.7
6.2 3.7 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.8 2.5 3.7 6.2
The following table summarizes the four linear cases. Again, those entries in
italics represent the outcomes that are sensitive to initial conditions.
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Summary of Linear Models
Preferences Global Local Utility Maximizing
10
F
i
j + d
i
j one city in corner cities in four corners one city in corner
F
i
j   d
i
j one city in center one city in center one city in center
 F
i
j + d
i
j edges with corner peaks edges with corner peaks edges with corner peaks
 F
i
j   d
i
j central sand pile central sand pile central sand pile
Note that there is substantial additivity in the equilibrium congurations. Attrac-
tion leads to a city in the center, and isolation leads to a uniform distribution. Combining
the two (isolated attraction) yields a centrally located sand pile. Checking other pairs of
eects reveals a common pattern. Therefore, there seems to be no meaningful externali-
ties between the two eects.
4 Nonlinear Preferences
The model is now extended to include nonlinear eects. Two cases are considered:
one with a nonlinear population term which shows that equilibria need not be ecient,
and one with a nonlinear separation term which exhibits extreme sensitivity to initial
conditions. In the rst scenario, a negative second order eect on population is assumed.
Standard explanations for negative external eect include congestion, pollution, crime,
or ineciencies in public good provision. The utility to an agent from being in location
(i; j) can be written as
u(i; j; F ) = F
ij
 
1
k
 (F
ij
)
2
where  is a positive constant. This change in preferences has a substantial impact on the
dynamics of city formation. In the global relocation scenario, the dynamics begin similar
to the linear case described above. The rst agent chooses from among the locations
with the largest population, and the second agent chooses the same location. However,
at some point the \city" becomes overcrowded and an agent chooses the location with
the second largest population. The result at the end of one round of relocations will be
several cities, the exact number of which varies directly with . All but the last of these
cities to form will have identical populations. In the second round of relocations, agents
move from the larger cities to the one smaller city until all cities have equal populations.
Global Relocations
u(i; j; F ) = F
ij
 
1
22
 (F
ij
)
2
23
20
20
20
20
20
The size of these cities is not utility maximizing. The rst city to form stops
increasing in population only when agents prefer to live in a location with a small popu-
lation. Therefore, the cities that form will be too large. The following claim states that
beginning from a uniform distribution, the resulting cities are exactly twice as large as
is optimal provided that the lattice is large relative to the population. A corollary to
the claim states that the equilibrium distribution oers no higher utility than the initial
distribution.
Claim 4.1 Let N
2
= m, u(i; j; F ) = F
ij
 
1
k
 (F
ij
)
2
, where k  4. Suppose initially that
F
ij
= 1 for all (i; j). Under global relocations the equilibria satisfy F
ij
 k   1 for all
(i; j).
pf: By assumption, all locations have identical populations equal to one initially. An
agent is selected at random and chooses from among the locations generating maximal
utility. The agent obtains utility 1 
1
k
 1 from her home location and 2 
4
k
 1 from
any other location. The second inequality follows from the assumption that k  4. Let
(i
0
; j
0
) denote the location that the rst agent chooses. In the future, agents will choose
this location until the utility from beginning another city exceeds the utility of joining
this city. Let a denote the smallest number such that an agent would prefer to choose to
remain alone at her location over a city with a agents, i.e.
a = minfb : 1 
1
k
 b 
b
2
k
g
The function f(b) = b 
b
2
k
is single peaked with a negative second derivative. A simple
calculation shows that f(k   1) = 1  
1
k
. Therefore, no cities can form which have
populations larger than k   1. Typically, cities no larger than k   2 will form as agents
can pair with other isolated agents to form cities of size two rather than join the larger
city.
Remember that agents relocate sequentially. The rst agent will relocate in the
location with the largest population. Subsequent agents choose the same location until
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that location's population equals k  2. This is nearly double the optimal size which can
be shown to be
k
2
. This intuition is formalized in the next claim.
Claim 4.2 Suppose that u(i; j; F ) = F
ij
 
1
k
 (F
ij
)
2
and that m = ck, where c is an
integer. The utility maximizing distributions satisfy F
ij
2 f0;
k
2
g for all (i; j).
pf: For k > 0, the function G(x) = x 
1
k
x
2
has a unique optimum at x =
k
2
. The proof
follows immediately.
Although these claims do not require sophisticated mathematics, they are inter-
esting nonetheless. There exist utility maximizing population distributions which are
equilibria. In fact, every utility maximizing distribution is an equilibrium. Moreover,
they are locally stable in the sense that if you randomly relocate a few agents, reloca-
tions will return you to these equilibria. Unfortunately, these locally stable equilibria are
not likely to be realized if agents begin uniformly distributed across the space. In fact,
the more likely equilibrium distributions have utility which is not much better than the
uniform distribution.
In the local relocation scenario, the dynamics do not change signicantly from
when utility monotonically increases with population. Agents choose the location in
their neighborhood with the largest population. Only in the case where k is quite small,
so that congestion appears quickly, does behavior change.
If utility is not monotonic in average distance to other agents, then the equilibrium
distribution changes in predictable ways, though it appears to be highly path dependent.
Under global relocation, the agents tend toward the center initially and then separate.
After the rst round of relocations, the agents are spread nearly uniformly near the center
of the lattice. In a series of trials, agents tended to concentrate in a few cities whose
distance from the center depends on the size of the nonlinear terms. The system does
not always stabilize. The next two gures show the enormous path dependence. Each
represents an equilibrium distribution for the case  =  1:25:
Local Relocations
u(i; j; F ) = d
c
(i; j; F )  1:25(d
c
(i; j; F ))
2
11 40
25
19 3 38
9.5 15.5
3.3
9.3 7.4
7.4 9.3
5 3.3
15.5 9.5
Each of these distributions has approximately the same aggregate utility. A ge-
netic algorithm attempting to nd a utility maximizing distribution located these as
utility maximizing distributions.
5 Discussion
This paper has examined the formation and emergence of cities, their spatial distribu-
tions, and the optimality of equilibrium distributions by employing a simple model. Two
eects, separation and population, can create much of the interesting behavior seen in
more sophisticated models. Path dependency results from preferences for population.
Central placement is the residue of preferences to minimize distances. More interest-
ingly, the transition from micro level preferences to macro level population distributions
was shown to be far from intuitive. Including higher order eects for even simple prefer-
ences obtains equilibrium population distributions which would not have been predicted.
Such ndings suggest that a deeper analysis of this mapping would be worth undertaking
before settling on a standard model or class of models for city formation.
This paper also addressed the notion of the emergence of cities. Emergence can
be characterized as unpredicted order or structure which results from the interaction of
simple local rules. Many earlier models, such as those in which agglomeration follows
immediately from assumptions of increasing returns, fail to satisfy this denition of emer-
gence. This paper has shown that cities can emerge in the strong sense { when agents
wish to maximize their average distance to other agents, they accumulate into cities.
Finally, the skeletal model in this paper can be extended in many directions.
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For example, natural advantage can be included by giving agents higher utility from
residing at or near certain locations. The introduction of such features can alter ndings
substantially. Natural advantage tends to reduce the sensitivity to initial conditions in the
pure agglomeration model. Other features such as population growth and heterogeneous
preferences can also be included which will enable researchers to get a better handle on
how the relocation incentives for agents contribute to the formation of cities.
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